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Abstract 
 
The “busy director” (multi-directorships) phenomenon increased in recent years, despite the 
substantial rise in directors’ responsibility and time demands.  Busy directors are more 
experienced and better connected than single-firm directors, but also more distracted.  The 
empirical evidence on the tradeoff between these two effects on board effectiveness is mixed.  
We depart from previous research by examining the reaction to a busy director’s resignation by 
the shareholders of the companies that still keep the director on their board.  Our findings 
indicate that when busy directors resign from a board, the investors of firms that continue 
boarding the director react positively to the news of the resignation.  Investor reaction is more 
positive when there is a larger demand for the director’s services, when the resignation frees up 
more of the director’s time, and when the director is of higher quality.  Our analysis suggests that 
three directorships are perceived optimal by investors.  Finally, investors’ positive reaction to the 
resignation of directors from other companies fails to fully capture the governance benefits of 








Corporate directors drew increased public attention , in the wake of multiple firms’ 
implosions, accounting scandals, and managerial compensation excesses during the first decade 
of this century (Enron, WorldCom, Lehman Bros., countrywide—a partial list). Directors’ 
independence, expertise (e.g., financial literacy), and the composition of the board’s audit and 
compensation committees were the focus of regulations (Sarbanes-Oxley) and stock exchange 
standards.  The drive by active shareholders to separate the CEO from the board’s chair or 
institute a lead independent director also gains momentum.  In contrast, an important aspect of 
directors’ effectiveness—the time and attention they can devote to the job—is largely overlooked 
by policymakers and the media.  The number of directorships a person holds—often along with a 
day job—is obviously a major determinant of the director’s effectiveness, yet there is no 
regulatory or exchange standard limit, or even guideline, on number of directorships.  Not 
surprisingly, we document a substantial increase in recent years in the multiple-directorship 
phenomenon. 
Our data show that from 1996 to 2010, while firms’ board size decreased, the mean 
number of directorships per person increased.  For example, whereas 26.8% of all directors held 
in 1998 two-or-more board positions, this percentage increased in 2010 to almost 40%.  And this 
occurred during a period of enhanced director responsibilities, significantly increasing the time 
required for the job: The Wall Street Journal (February 29, 2012) reports a substantial increase in 
the time devoted by directors to a board, from an annual mean of 150 hours in 2003 to 227 hours 
in 2011. A 51% increase! 
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There is, however, a tension in the multiple directorship issue.  Highly demanded 
directors—busy, or over-boarded in the governance parlance—have obviously an above-average 
reputational capital that enhances their effectiveness.1  They are also more experienced in 
governance than the single directorship person and often bring to bear substantial industry 
expertise.  So, the tradeoffs between the pros of directors’ reputational capital/expertise and the 
cons of distraction and limited attention are a natural subject for research.  Yet, the evidence on 
this issue is somewhat sparse, and the findings mixed.  One study, for example, reports no 
relation between multiple-board directors and firm performance (Ferris et al., 2003), whereas 
another study finds an association between busy directors and firm underperformance (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006).  To cloud the issue further, Field et al. (2011) report a positive association 
between busy directors and the performance of early-stage firms.  Closer to our study, Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006), in an event study, report that the departure of a busy director from the board 
triggers a positive abnormal stock return, and vice versa for the appointment of such a director.  
Our methodology departs from extant research, in that we examine busy directors’ 
resignations by focusing on the stock price reaction of the firms that still keep these directors on 
their boards.  Focusing on the price reaction of these “retaining firms” provides a clean test of the 
busy director phenomenon, since the resignation of a director from a board is likely endogenous 
(directors resigning from failing firms or because of a controversial acquisition), muddying the 
price reaction to the resignation at the “resigned firm.”2  But the likelihood of endogeneity at the 
“retaining firms” is remote. Our methodology also provides for a larger sample of firms being 
left with less-distracted directors.  Regarding the choice between examining appointments or 
                                                            
1 Studies show that the directors of well-performing firms tend to hold multiple board appointments (Gilson, 1990; 
Booth and Deli, 1996; Brickley et al., 1999). 
2 For example, Hewllett-Packard’s highly controversial acquisition of Compaq in 2002 caused several directors to 
resign from H-P board. 
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resignations of busy directors, we chose the latter mainly because extant research focuses on 
appointments.  We thus provide the missing piece of the puzzle.  More subtly, when the research 
issue is the tradeoff between the positive reputation effect of a busy director and the negative 
distraction effect (discussed above), then for appointments, the distraction effect obviously 
trumps the reputation effect.  The incremental reputation of a busy director being appointed to 
another board cannot be large but the distraction negatively affects all his/her boards.  Hence, the 
largely unsurprising finding of a negative market reaction to the appointment of a busy director.  
In contrast, a director’s resignation likely affects negatively his/her reputation (rumored to be a 
trouble-maker, not a team player or abandoning a struggling business).  And since the real 
reasons for the resignation are rarely revealed, a certain cloud surrounds the resigning director.  
Examining the price reaction of the firms still retaining the resigning director, therefore, provides 
a more meaningful test of the reputation vs. distraction of busy directors.   
Our examination of busy directors’ resignation focuses on a sample of 279 directors who 
resigned from a board position during 2004-2007, while still serving on one or more other 
boards.  We find that the resigning directors have a shorter-than-average tenure at the time of 
resignation, suggesting the unexpected nature of the resignation.  These directors tend to resign 
from smaller, slower growing, and less profitable companies, while continuing their service on 
the boards of larger and better-performing firms.  The resignation choice of these directors, 
however, is not associated with increased firm risk, or deterioration in firm performance at the 
“resigned firms.”       
In our test of investor reaction to the busy directors’ resignation, we focus on the 
abnormal stock returns around the announcement date of the resignation at the firms that are still 
associated with the resigning director.  Using standard methodology of event study, we find 
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significantly positive and economically meaningful three-day cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) at the firms that still board the busy directors.  This reflects investors’ expectation, 
which we corroborate empirically, that the less distracted directors will devote more time and 
attention to their firm’s governance.  Less distraction trumps a potentially diminished reputation.  
We also provide evidence on the determinants of investor reaction to busy directors’ 
resignation from another firm.  It is more positive when the demand for director services at the 
“retaining firm” is greater, such as when the firm operates in a volatile environment (technology-
based companies), or when it is smaller with higher risks.  Investors’ reaction is also enhanced 
when the resignation frees up more of the directors’ time.3  Finally, investors’ reaction at the 
“retaining firms” increases with the quality of the resigning director, indicated by the director’s 
experience in monitoring firms with complex operations.  Directors who are currently CEOs and 
those who served on audit committees and/or played leadership roles in corporate governance 
also trigger a more positive reaction at the “retaining firms.”  Finally, we find that a 
comprehensive index incorporating the information in all relevant director and firm attributes 
mentioned above provides a more informative measure of the expected contribution and value of 
busy directors than the individual attributes.  This is of interest to those who wish to exploit 
directors’ resignation for investment purposes.            
We also examine whether investors in the “retaining firms” fully comprehend the benefits 
of their directors resigning from other firms at the time of resignation.  We find that the 
“retaining firms” exhibit positive abnormal returns subsequent to the resignation, indicating that 
investors underestimate the benefits of the time and attention freed up by the resignation.                
                                                            
3 For example, a person with two directorships, resigning from one, frees more time than a director serving on four 
boards, resigning from one. 
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Finally, given the widely perceived reputational advantage of busy directors and our 
evidence showing investors’ preference for less distracted directors, an important question for 
investors, directors, and regulators is whether there exists an optimal number of board seats for 
busy directors.  Our evidence suggests that the optimal level of board commitment from 
investors’ perspective is around three board seats.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  In section II, we briefly review prior 
literature and highlight the distinguishing aspects of our study.  Section III describes the sample 
and data we use.  We report the results of our examination of the market reaction to busy 
directors’ resignation in section IV and multivariate tests are reported in section V.  In section 
VI, we examine whether investors fully comprehend the consequences of directors’ resignation, 
while Section VII investigates whether the resigning busy directors join other boards subsequent 
to the resignation.  We estimate the optimal number of board seats for busy directors in Section 
VIII. Section IX concludes our study.  
 
II. Prior Literature on Busy Directors 
Early studies on busy directors argued that the market for directors is efficient and that 
the demand for directors’ services signals their value, reflecting directors’ visibility and 
reputation (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Mace, 1986).  Consistent with this view, 
subsequent studies reported that directors who serve on the boards of successful firms (including 
the firm’s own top executives and other insiders) are more likely to receive multiple board 
appointments, suggesting a positive association between over-boarding and perceived director 
quality (e.g., Gilson, 1990; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Shivdasani, 1993; Booth and Deli, 1996; 
Brickley, et al., 1999; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011).       
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Subsequent studies directly examined the relation between busy directors and the 
performance and governance of the firms they serve, yielding mixed results.  For example, Ferris 
et al. (2003) report no relation between the presence of busy directors and firms’ performance 
and conclude that busy directors do not shirk their responsibilities while serving on multiple 
boards.  In contrast, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) report that firms where the majority of the board 
consists of busy directors have weak corporate governance and relatively poor performance.  
Beasley (1996) documents a higher probability of accounting fraud among firms with busy 
directors, and Core et al. (1999) find that firms with busy directors tend to offer excessive 
executive compensation and have poor performance.  Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest 
that director independence may be weakened when they hold multiple board seats.  Further 
muddying the evidence, Field et al. (2011) find that busy directors contribute positively to 
young, early-stage firms (e.g., firms shortly before and after IPO).  Chandar et al. (2012) report 
that fewer busy directors on board strengthen financial reporting quality, documenting a non-
linear interaction between the quality and the distraction effect of such directors. 
Our study is related to prior research on the market reaction to changes in the level of 
director over-boarding.  Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find a negative market reaction for firms 
that appoint busy, outside directors, consistent with shareholders’ concerns about director 
distraction.  They also report a positive market reaction to the resignation of busy directors.  
Masulis and Mobbs (2011) document a positive market reaction for firms with inside directors  
(executives) who receive the first directorship in another firm, and a negative market reaction for 
subsequent appointments, consistent with the adverse effect of director over-boarding.  Our study 
departs from previous research by focusing on the market reaction to busy directors’ resignation 
at the firms that still retain these directors (while we also document the reaction at the “resigned 
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firms”).  Our study is also related to existing research on the factors associated with directors’ 
resignation decision.  Prior research finds that directors are more likely to resign from firms with 
unfavorable conditions, such as declining current and future performance, high risk, low director 
compensation, and forthcoming adverse events (e.g., Yermack, 2004; Asthana and Balsam, 
2007; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010b; Bar-Hava and Segal, 2010).  We, in contrast, find that busy 
directors’ resignation is not associated with performance and liquidity deterioration.  Rather busy 
directors are more likely to resign from less successful and prominent firms (e.g., smaller and 
lower growth firms), as keeping a board seat at such firms likely confers less prestige and 
monetary benefits, which may not justify the heavy workload and responsibilities required for 
the position.         
 
III. Sample and Data 
 
A. Summary Statistics on Directors: 1996 to 2010 
 
We examine the population of all directors covered by Risk Metrics over the period 
1996-2010.  This database covers a total of 23,259 firms across 15 years, with an average of 
1,550 firms per year.  The number of directors included in the database also varies by year, with 
an average of 11,727 directors per year.   
Panel A of Table 1 presents statistics for the number of firms, director positions, and 
directors.  Since there are currently about 5,500 public companies listed on U.S. exchanges, the 
number of firms in Table 1, about 1,500, indicates that Risk Metrics covers less than a third of 
firms, likely the largest ones. Notably, the average number of directors per firm—board size—
decreased over the period by one director (from 10.3 to 9.36).4  
                                                            
4 Prior research suggests that larger boards are less effective in terms of corporate governance (e.g., Yermack, 1996). 
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The implications of a shrinking board size should be contrasted with major increases in 
director responsibilities during the period, as the result of more stringent and onerous regulations 
of corporate governance (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act enacted in 2002 and various exchange 
regulations).  There is also a heightened investor scrutiny of director negligence in corporate 
misbehavior, reflected in more directors being targets of shareholder lawsuits and SEC 
enforcement actions. The pattern of shrinking board size indicates a further increase over time in 
the workload and responsibilities of directors.        
 The right two columns of Panel A inform on the mean and standard deviation of the 
board positions held by a director in each year.5  We observe an increase over time in the average 
number of public company board positions held by a director.  In 1998, the average number of 
board positions held by a director was 1.46, increasing to 1.61 in 2010.  
Panel B provides a detailed account of the increase in the number (percentage) of public 
company board positions held by a director.  In 2010, 6,962 directors (60.3% of all directors) 
served on only one board, compared to 7,299 directors (67.1% of all directors) in 2006 and 9,465 
directors (73.2% of all directors) in 1998; a constantly shrinking percentage of single-board 
directors.  The percentage of directors holding two or three board positions—the lion’s share of 
multi-directorships—has gradually increased from 22.5% (= 15.3%+7.2%) in 1998 to 29.4% 
(21.6%+7.8%) in 2006, and further to 35% (= 24.5%+10.5%) in 2010—an overall growth rate of 
55%.  Notably, the percentage of directors serving on two or three boards jumped in 2007 (from 
29.4% to 34.2%), remaining stable thereafter, perhaps related to the financial crisis.  Taken 
together, the data in Panels A and B indicate that directors have become busier over time by 
                                                            
5 The number of public company board positions held by a director also includes public companies that are not 
covered by Risk Metrics. 
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taking more board positions.  The growing popularity of busy directors in board rooms may 
reflect increased demand for qualified, experienced directors during challenging economic times.   
Panel C of Table 1 shows a substantial increase in the age of directors: the mean (median) 
age of directors was 58.80 (59) in 1996 vs. 62.14 (63) in 2010.  To the extent that director age is 
positively associated with experience and expertise, this increase is consistent with firms’ 
preferences for more experienced reputable directors.  Panel D, however, shows a nearly flat 
pattern of director tenure over time.  The mean (median) director tenure is 8.99 (6) over the 
period of 1998-2010.   
 
B. Descriptive Information on the Resigning Busy Directors  
We define busy directors as those who serve on the boards of two or more public 
companies, a threshold for classifying a director as busy which is lower than that of prior studies.  
We employ this lower threshold to include a larger sample to assess whether the effect of busy 
directors extends to a broader set of directors than previously examined.  Our sample, which 
focuses on busy directors’ resignations, is derived from the sample of all directors’ resignations 
used in the study of Bar-Hava and Segal (2010).  This study is based on a comprehensive search 
across all 8-K reports included in the Edgar database for the period of 2004-2007. Bar-Hava and 
Segal identified 1,054 cases of director resignations for which there were no confounding events 
over a 3-day window of the resignation announcement.  Of this initial sample, we retain a final 
sample of 279 busy directors who served on two or more boards of public companies before the 
resignation.  We also collect from the proxy statement information on the director’s role as a 
CEO (of another firm), whether he/she served on the audit committee, or in a leadership role in 
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governance and control (chairing the corporate governance committee and/or nominating 
committee). 
  Table 2 provides summary statistics for these 279 resigning directors.  The number of 
resignations by busy directors varies from year to year, ranging from 36 resignations in 2004 to 
114 resignations in 2006.  Panel A reports the number of all types of board positions, including 
public companies, private firms, and not-for-profit organizations, that are still held by the busy 
director after the resignation.  The mean and median number of boards kept by the resigning 
directors are 3.2 and 3.0, respectively.  Thus, these directors keep significant board 
responsibilities even after their resignation.   
Panel B reports the distribution of the public company boards kept by the busy director 
after the resignation.  The mean (median) number is 1.828 (1.000), indicating that a large number 
of the busy directors in our sample continue to hold multiple board positions at other public 
companies.  Compared to the population of all directors reported in Table 1, Panel A, the 
resigning busy directors included in our sample hold a greater number of board positions.  For 
example, on average, these directors serve on 1.991 (2.991) boards after (before) the resignation 
in 2006, whereas the average number of board positions for all directors is 1.49 in the same year 
(Table 1, Panel A).   
Panel C reports the age of busy directors in the year of resignation.  The mean (median) 
age is 56.118 (57) years across all sample years.  Compared to the population of all directors 
reported in Table 1, Panel C, whose mean (median) age ranges from 59.36 to 61.60 (60 to 62) 
during the same period (2004-2007), the resigning busy directors included in our sample are 
younger by 3-4 years.  Thus, the resignation doesn’t appear to be age-related.  Panel D, Table 2, 
reports the statistics for director tenure, measured as the number of years of service rendered by 
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the busy directors until resignation.  The mean and median director tenures are 5.004 and 4 
years, respectively across all sample years, which is substantially shorter than the average tenure 
of all directors during the same period: mean (median) tenure for all directors is 8.59 years (6 
years) for the period of 2004-2010.  To the extent that investors expect directors to serve a 
standard term, resignation by directors with less than the average tenure is likely unexpected and 
thus conveys newsworthy information.  Table 2, Panel E shows that the equity holding by busy 
directors included in our sample is relatively small: the majority (82.4%) of the directors holds 
less than 1% of the firm’s equity.                
Table 3 lists the reasons cited for the busy directors’ resignation.  We obtained this 
information directly from firms’ 8-K filings of the announcement of the resignation.  We classify 
the cited reasons for the resignation into 11 non-overlapping categories.  The data shows that 
approximately 30% of the resignation filings report no specific reason, whereas slightly more 
than a quarter (26.1%) of the resignations are characterized as no-disagreement between the 
director and the firm.  The next three most commonly cited reasons are the director’s other 
commitments (17.56%), personal reasons (10.04%), and the requirement to meet independence 
standards (7.53%).  Across all sample years, these five types of reasons account for 90% of the 
resignations.  The distribution of resignation reasons is similar across sample years.       
 
C. Characteristics of the “Resigned” and “Retaining” Firms  
 
Table 4 provides information on the two groups of firms that are associated with the 
resigning busy directors: firms from which the directors resigned (“resigned firms” hereafter), 
and the firms that still retain the busy directors (“retaining firms” hereafter).  There are 279 
resigned firms in our sample, and 445 retaining firms.  Table 4 reports sample firms’ industry 
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membership based on two-digit SIC.  The top five industries of the resigned firms are: chemical 
and pharmaceutical products (12.5%), computer software and data processing (11.5%), electrical 
and electronics (9.3%), insurance carrier (6.5%), and communication (5.7%).  Together these 
five industries account for 45.5% of the resigned firms sample.  Except for insurance carriers, 
these industries are typically technology-driven and intangibles-intensive businesses.  A similar, 
yet less marked pattern of industry concentration is observed for the 445 retaining firms.  These 
same five industries account for 36.6% of the sample of the retaining firms.  The higher 
concentration of technology-based industries in the sample of resigned firms suggests that the 
relatively high risk and operational complexity associated with monitoring technology-based 
companies may play a role in busy directors’ decision to resign. However, relative to all firms in 
the industry (right-hand columns of triplets), rather than relative to the total sample, there isn’t a 
significant industry concentration in the “resigned” or “retaining” samples.    
In Table 5, we compare key financial characteristics of the resigned and retaining firms, 
respectively.  A comparison based on the median values indicates that busy directors tend to 
resign from smaller firms (by total assets), less profitable firms (lower ROA), lower growth firms 
(lower market-to-book), firms with lower cash flows from operation deflated by average total 
assets (CFO), and firms with lower capital investment (deflated by total assets), than the 
“retaining” firms.  The resigned firms also have lower leverage ratios (long-term liabilities to 
total assets) and higher current ratios.6  Notably, at the median, the resigned and retaining firms 
have similar changes in key indicators of financial health, including changes in ROA, CFO, 
leverage ratio, and current ratio.  Taken together, these comparisons suggest that directors tend to 
                                                            
6  The lower leverage and higher liquidity of the resigned firms may be related to the higher concentration of 
technology industries (e.g., electronics and software) among these firms.  Because of the high risk associated with 
technology firms, they tend to have less debt for both the short-term and long-term.   
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resign from less successful and prominent firms, although performance or liquidity deterioration 
doesn’t seem to be a resignation motive. If director resignation is mainly motivated by heavy 
workload, it makes sense to resign first from smaller—lower director compensation—and less 
prominent firms, as the evidence suggests.    
          
IV. Investors’ Reaction to the Resignation of Busy Directors 
 
A. Overall Reaction  
We hand-collect the announcement date of director resignation from the resigned firms’ 
8-K filings, which provide the first public disclosure of the director’s resignation.  We follow the 
standard approach of event study (e.g., Brown and Warner, 1985) to measure the three-day (i.e., 
days –1, 0 and +1, centered on the announcement date) abnormal stock returns of the retaining 
firms still boarding the resigning directors.  For each day during the event period, abnormal 
returns are measured as the difference between the firm’s raw return and the return on the size 
decile portfolio to which the firm is assigned.  We sum up the abnormal returns across the three 
days to compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each retaining firm.  We then compute 
the mean value of the three-day CARs across all retaining firms and assess its statistical 
significance on the basis of the p-values determined by following the procedure of Brown and 
Warner (1985).7           
Table 6 provides the stock price reaction to the news of busy directors’ resignation.  In 
Panel A, we report the mean of the three-day CARs and their p-values for all of the 360 retaining 
firms that have the stock returns data required by our test.  The mean three-day CAR is 0.40%, 
                                                            
7 Under this approach, the standard deviation of the mean cumulative abnormal returns is estimated by using 239 
days of return data (days –233 through days –6 relative to the announcement day).  The test statistic controls for 
cross-sectional dependence in the abnormal returns because a portfolio average abnormal return is used to estimate 
the standard deviation.  
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significant at the 0.051 level, one-tailed test.  Thus, investors in the retaining firms react 
positively to the news of busy directors’ resignation in other firms.  This is consistent with an 
appreciation of the increased time and attention that directors can devote to the retaining firms 
after they reduce their other board commitments and responsibilities.              
 
B. Conditional investor reaction 
The overall mean reaction to director resignation obscures the individual factors affecting 
the reaction. To flesh out these factors, we selected several director and firm attributes for closer 
inspection. We posit that investors’ (in the retaining firms) valuation of the time and attention 
released by director resignation is affected by: (1) the demand for director services (e.g., the need 
to monitor and advise inexperienced managers), and (2) the supply of high quality directors.  
Investor reaction to busy directors’ resignation and its implications is likely more positive when 
the demand for director services is high and when the resigning directors have special 
capabilities to fulfill their mission.   
The demand for director monitoring and advisory services is likely greater when the 
retaining firm operates in particularly challenging and uncertain sectors, such as technology-
based industries, where barriers to entry are low and the pace of innovation quick.  The assets of 
these firms are mostly intangible (patents, trademark, unique business processes), being 
particularly risky and hard to manage.  The demand for director guidance is also greater for start-
ups and smaller firms, generally having greater growth prospects and facing higher risk (more 
likely to operate in emerging industries and new markets).  Accordingly, we expect more 
positive investor reaction to the news of busy directors’ resignation when the retaining firm 
operates in technology sectors and/or is a smaller firm.     
15 
 
When a busy director resigns, a certain amount of time and attention is freed up and 
becomes available to the boards of the retaining firms.  The amount and value of this released 
time is likely greater when the director had serious responsibilities in the resigned firm’s board.  
We also conjecture that director responsibilities are greater when the firm experiences 
performance problems, which we proxy by earnings decreases, since earnings decreases are 
symptoms of higher director involvement.  Directors can also devote more time and attention to 
the retaining firm if they served on fewer boards.  For example, a director who keeps two board 
seats after the resignation frees up 1/3 of his/her total available time, whereas a director who 
keeps 4 board seats after the resignation frees up only 1/5 of his/her time.  Accordingly, we 
predict a more positive market reaction when the busy director resigned from the board of an 
earnings-decreasing firm, or served on fewer boards after the resignation. 
The quality of director services, however, is less straightforward to observe and measure.  
We infer this attribute from relatively objective indicators, based on the job description and the 
director’s knowledge and skills.  Because certain dimensions of directors’ knowledge and skills 
are industry-specific (industry expertise), the quality of director’s contribution is likely greater 
when the “retaining firms” are in the same industry as the “resigned firms.”  Therefore, we 
expect a more positive market reaction to resignation when the “retaining firm” is from the same 
industry as the “resigned firm.”  The quality of director service is also related to the number of 
analysts following the resigned firm, because firms followed by many analysts tend to have more 
involved operations, invest more in complex assets (e.g., intangibles), and face greater investor 
scrutiny, thereby likely appointing more experienced and capable directors.8  Thus, we expect a 
                                                            
8 Barth et al. (2001) find that analyst coverage and effort are greater for firms that invest more in intangible assets, 
which are more complex and more difficult to manage than tangible assets. 
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more positive market reaction when the director resigns from a firm with a larger analyst 
following. 
Finally, the intrinsic capabilities and quality of directors are also indicated by their job 
responsibilities as a top executive or by his/her board responsibilities.  Directors who currently 
serve as a CEO of another firm, or those who served on the audit committee, or played a 
leadership role in corporate governance of the resigned firm (e.g., financial experts and experts 
on governance) will likely contribute more to the retaining firms than directors without these 
credentials.9  When a director relinquishes the heavier responsibilities of serving on an audit 
committee or leading corporate governance (lead director), there is also likely a larger time 
release benefitting the retaining firm.  Therefore, we expect a more positive market reaction 
when the resigning director is a CEO, or served on the audit committee or chaired the corporate 
governance committee and/or nominating committee of the resigned firm.     
 
C. Investors’ reaction by determinants 
Panels B through E of Table 6 report on univariate tests examining the market reaction of 
the “retaining firms” investors to busy directors’ resignation, conditioned on specific 
determinants.  For expositional purposes, we classify these determinants into three groups: (1) 
characteristics of the “retaining firms,” creating demand for director services, (Panel B), (2) 
characteristics of the “resigned firm” (Panel C), and (3) capabilities of the resigning busy 
directors (Panel D).  In Panel E, we consider the joint effects of all determinants.  
In Panel B, we first partition the sample of 360 “retaining firms” by whether the firm is 
from one of six technology industries: chemical and pharmaceutical, computer and machinery, 
                                                            
9 Prior research finds that CEOs are particularly desirable choices of outside directors because of their  experience as 
executives (e.g., Fahlenbrach et al., 2010a), and that directors who are also financial experts are more valuable than 
others (e.g., DeFond et al., 2005). 
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electrical and electronics, transportation equipment, medical and scientific instrument, and 
computer software, or other industries.  The results show that the three-day CARs—investor 
reaction—for technology firms are significantly larger than those for other firms (1.38% vs.        
–0.13%), corroborating our conjecture that the more complex tech and science-based firms 
benefit more from the time released by the resigning directors.  In B2, we divide the sample of 
retaining firms into two size groups, based on whether the firm’s market value is below or above 
the median market value of all retaining firms.  The results indicate that market reaction to the 
busy directors’ resignation is significantly larger for smaller firms than for larger ones (0.72% vs. 
0.09%), indicating the larger benefits to smaller firm, often managed by inexperienced managers 
with smaller support staff, from directors’ released time.  In B3, we partition the retaining firms 
on whether the resigning director is from the same industry or not.  Consistent with our 
prediction, we find a significantly more positive market reaction when the retaining firm is from 
the same industry as the resigned firm (0.96% vs. 0.23%), indicating more valuable industry-
specific expertise. 
Panel C presents investors’ reaction in the retaining firms partitioned by whether the 
resigned firm experienced earnings decreases in the recent year (C1) and whether the resigned 
firm has a large number of analyst following (C2).  Consistent with our predictions, we find that 
there is a more positive market reaction when busy directors resign from firms experiencing 
earnings decreases (0.86% vs. 0.14%), indicating a substantial release of director’s time after 
resigning from a troubled company, and when they resign from firms with a larger analyst 
following (0.59% vs. –0.07%).  In Panel D, we partition the sample of retaining firms by the 
attributes of the resigning directors: in (D1) the number of boards served by the director after 
resignation (no more than 4 vs. more than 4), (D2) whether the director is a CEO of another 
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company (currently being a CEO vs. not currently being a CEO), (D3) whether the director 
served on the audit committee of the “resigned firm,” and (D4) whether the director chaired the 
corporate governance committee and/or nominating committee of the “resigned firm.”  
Consistent with our predictions, we find that the market reaction is significantly more positive 
when the resigning directors serve on fewer boards (0.65% vs. –0.17% in D1)—more time 
released—when the director is a CEO (1.01% vs. 0.27% in D2)—more qualified—when the 
director served on the audit committee (1.31% vs. –0.06% in D3), or when the director chaired 
the corporate governance committee and/or nominating committee of the resigned firm (2.00% 
vs. 0.34% in D4)—all indicating high quality and experience of the resigning directors.      
Taken together, the univariate tests lend consistent support to our prediction that 
investors in the retaining firms value the newly released time and attention of the resigning 
directors more highly when there is a greater demand for the director’s service at the retaining 
firms (high tech, small, or same-industry firms), when more time is released by the resignation 
(resigning director served on fewer boards), and when the resigning director possesses higher 
qualifications and experience (a CEO, lead director, member of audit committee).  
In Panel E, we examine whether a joint consideration of the nine director and firm 
characteristics reported in Panels B through D is more powerful in explaining market reaction to 
the busy directors’ resignation than the individual attributes.  To incorporate the information 
from all nine attributes, we perform a principal component analysis and use the first two 
principal components as our aggregate indicators for the expected contribution and value of the 
resigning directors.  In this analysis, all director and firm characteristics are included as dummy 
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variables, except for firm size, which is measured as the firm’s market value.10  We use the two 
principal components reflecting the nine attributes to partition the “retaining firms” to quartiles 
on a 4×4 table.  That is, we sort all “retaining firms” into quartiles based on these two indicators, 
respectively.  We focus on the main diagonal at the intersection of these quartiles which reflects 
the joint effects of the two principal components.  By construction, the highest-highest (lowest-
lowest) quartile consists of firms that are simultaneously classified into the highest (lowest) 
quartile of the first principal component and the highest (lowest) quartile of the second principal 
component (i.e., the intersection of these two quartiles).  Low-medium is for the second lowest 
quartile, whereas medium-high is for the second highest quartile.  Thus, moving from the 
highest-highest quartile to the lowest-lowest quartile gives a sorting of the “retaining firms” in a 
descending order of expected contribution and value of the resigning directors. 
The data in Panel E indicate that the market reaction to busy directors’ resignation indeed 
varies positively with the aggregate expected contribution and value of the director.  Firms 
classified as expected to benefit most from the resigning directors (i.e., the highest-highest 
quartile) earned three-day mean CAR of 4.07% (significant at the 0.034 level), whereas firms 
associated with the least contributing resigning directors (i.e., the lowest-lowest quartile) earned 
three-day CAR of only 0.09% (statistically insignificant).  The mean return spread between the 
most valuable and least valuable directors—almost 4% in three days—is statistically and 
economically meaningful, indicating that incorporating the nine director and firm attributes 
provides a more informative measure for the contribution and value of the resigning directors. 
 
D. Multivariate Analysis 
                                                            
10 Our results are similar when we use a dummy variable to distinguish firms with above-median market value from 
those with below-median market value. 
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In Table 7, we report the multivariate estimates based on the regression of market 
reaction to resignation on the nine director and firms characteristics presented in Table 6, and the 
two principal components derived from these nine characteristics.  Following the structure of 
Table 6, we include these characteristics in groups of three separate regressions (Models 1, 2, 
and 3) and all together in one regression (Model 4).  In Model 5, we include the two principal 
components—joint effect of determinants—as the sole independent variables. Regression models 
1-3 indicate that, with the exception of the industry overlap, all the variables hypothesized to 
affect market reaction are statistically significant. The two principal components (Model 5) are 
also statistically significant.   Model 4 indicates that these nine director and firm characteristics 
combined explain 7.6% of the variability of the market reaction to busy directors’ resignation.  In 
all, the results from our multivariate analysis in Table 7 are consistent with the univariate results 
presented in Table 6.  The multivariate results further substantiate our conclusion that decreasing 
the load of busy directors is favored by investors, and that various predictable director and firm 
characteristics related to the demand and supply of director services are value-relevant to the 
investors of retaining firms.      
 
V. A Reaction to Time and Attention Released or a Signaling Story? 
We conjectured so far that the retaining firms investors’ positive reaction to the 
resignation of busy directors is triggered by the value of time and attention released by the 
resignation.  Our conditional analysis, reported in Table 6, supports this conjecture (e.g., a 
stronger reaction when more time is released or when the resigning director is highly qualified). 
It can nevertheless be argued that investor reaction in the retaining firms primarily reflects the 
signal provided by the resigning director: negative for the resigned firm (abandoning a sinking 
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ship), and, by default, positive for the retaining firms (staying with winning enterprises).  
Obviously, a negative investor reaction to the resignation at the “resigned firms” will support a 
signaling scenario.  Consistent with our test of market reaction at the retaining firms, we use the 
standard methodology of event study to measure investor reaction at the resigned firms, with the 
three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the stocks of the resigned firms around the 
announcement date of the resignation (i.e., days –1, 0, and +1 centered on the event date).       
Table 8 provides the stock price reaction for the resigned firms.  We report the mean and 
median value of the three-day CARs and the associated p-value for the 238 resigned firms that 
have the stock return data required by our test.  However, we find that for the resigned firms the 
mean three-day CARs related to the directors’ resignation is a positive 0.86% (significant at the 
0.002 level, one-tailed).  The median three-day CAR is also positive (0.22%) and statistically 
significant at the 0.018 level (one-tailed).  These results, consistent with prior evidence (e.g., 
Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), indicate that investors of the resigned firms also welcome the 
resignation of busy directors who are distracted and likely less effective in terms of corporate 
governance.  We thus find no evidence of a signaling effect of the resigning directors. 
 
VI. Do Investors Fully Comprehend Directors’ Resignation? 
 
We saw that shareholders of the retaining firms react positively to the resignation of busy 
directors from other firms’ boards.  But does this 3-day market reaction fully reflect the benefits 
of the released time and attention of the resigning directors?  This question has obvious 
implications for the extent to which investors comprehend  market events and for capital markets 
efficiency in general.  While some investors in the retaining firms obviously react in time to 
director resignation from other firms, the majority of investors may not even be aware that 
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directors of their firms have now more time and attention to devote to their firms.  Put 
differently, is the “busyness” of directors an important factor that investors should monitor?  If 
the released time of the resigning directors is valuable, and not fully comprehended at 
resignation time, then the stocks of the retaining firms will earn positive abnormal returns 
subsequent to the resignation announcement.    
We examine this issue by using the Fama-MacBeth (Fama and MacBeth, 1973) monthly 
methodology to record whether busy directors’ resignation is indeed associated with long-run 
abnormal returns at the retaining firms.  The dependent variable of the regression is the retaining 
firms’ monthly returns over next 12-months following the resignation (excluding the resignation 
month).  The independent variables are: the logarithm of the firm’s market value (Ln(MV)), the 
logarithm of the firm’s book-to-market ratio (Ln(B/M)) at the end of the most recent fiscal-year, 
the return of the prior month (Ret_1), the return of the previous 12-month period (Ret_2), the 
return of the previous 36-month period (Ret_3), and a dummy variable for busy directors’ 
resignation (RESIGN), which equals one if the firm keeps a director who recently resigned from 
another firm and zero otherwise. We also include in the regression the director value as measured 
by indicators #1 and #2, which are the first two principal components derived from the nine 
director and firm characteristics presented in Table 6.   
This regression includes firms that keep the resigning busy directors (i.e., the retaining 
firms) along with all other firms.  Accordingly, the dummy variable for busy directors’ 
resignation (RESIGN) and the two variables for the director value take the value of zero for all 
firms other than the retaining firms.  For each event of director resignation, the retaining firms’ 
monthly returns of the subsequent 12 months are used as the dependent variable of the 
regression.  Because the first event of resignation by busy directors included in our sample is in 
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February 2004 and the last event is in December 2007, the future return period included in the 
regression is from March, 2004 through December, 2008 and spans a total of 58 months.   
We report the results of the Fama-MacBeth monthly regression in Table 9, Panel A, 
noting that there are significant positive abnormal returns associated with the resignation of busy 
directors (Model 1 and Model 2).  In Model 1, the mean coefficient on the dummy variable of 
busy directors’ resignation (RESIGN) is 0.013 (statistically significant at the 0.019 level).  Thus, 
compared to other firms, the retaining firms earn, on average, monthly abnormal returns of 1.3%, 
equivalent to 16.8% on an annual basis—an economically significant return for the retaining 
firms.  The mean coefficients on the director value indices are also significantly positive (Model 
2), indicating even higher future abnormal returns associated with director resignation.  Thus, 
investors in firms whose directors became “less busy” do not fully appreciate the value of this 
event at the resignation time.  This is not entirely surprising, since it is hard to believe that most 
investors monitor closely directors’ employment in other firms.  But it does create a profit 
opportunity from watching directors’ “busyness.” 
We employ the same methodology of the Fama-MacBeth monthly regressions to examine 
the one-year-ahead returns of the resigned firms.  This regression also includes the resigned 
firms and all other firms.  Control variables include Ln(MV), Ln(B/M), Ret_1, Ret_2, and Ret_3.  
The variable of interest is once more RESIGN, a dummy variable that takes the value of one for 
the resigned firms and zero otherwise.  The set-up of this regression is similar to that of the 
retaining firms in Panel A.  For each event of director resignation, the resigned firms’ monthly 
returns of the subsequent 12 months are used as the dependent variable of the regression.  The 
monthly regression period is from March, 2004 through December, 2008, spanning a total of 58 
months.      
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We report the estimates of this test in Table 9, Panel B.  In Model 2, the mean coefficient 
on the dummy variable of busy directors’ resignation (RESIGN) is 0.002, statistically 
insignificant.  Thus, unlike the case for the retaining firms, there are no future abnormal returns 
for the resigned firms, suggesting that investors of the resigned firms react fully to the news of 
busy directors’ resignation when it is announced.  This too is not surprising, since shareholders 
are generally aware of director resignation in their firms, in contrast with resignations from other 
firms. 
 
VII. Do the Resigning Directors Become More Available and More Involved? 
 
We conjectured above that a busy director’s resignation frees time and attention to devote 
to other firms (retaining firms). But, does this happen in reality? To provide direct evidence on 
the effects of resignation on the director’s availability and contribution to the retaining firm, we 
examine changes in director responsibilities at the retaining firms following the director’s 
resignation from the resigned firm.  We record director responsibilities at a given board by 
his/her role in key committees, such as the audit committee, compensation committee, and 
nominating/governance committee.  In particular, directors who become the chair or member of 
additional committees after resignation have greater board responsibilities and likely make 
greater contributions to the board.  Table 10, Panel A reports the number and type of committees 
served by the resigning director at the retaining firm in the year immediately before the 
resignation (year t–1), the year immediately after the resignation (year t+1), and the difference.  
The data results are for 134 out of the 445 (30%) retaining firm boards for which complete 
information for director responsibilities is available in Risk Metrics for both year t–1 and year 
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t+1.11  Focusing on directors who chair audit committees and/or compensation committees, two 
board structures of critical importance to corporate governance, we find a significant increase 
after the director’s resignation (0.239 chairs per director in year t–1 vs. 0.314 in year t+1).  Thus, 
there is a 30% increase in the director’s involvement in audit committees and compensation 
committees following the resignation.  We also find significant increases in the number of 
directors serving on compensation committee and nominating/governance committee after the 
resignation.12  Combining all committees and board positions, our results show a significant 
increase in board responsibilities by directors after their resignation (1.425 for year t–1 vs. 1.590 
for year t+1).  We thus provide direct evidence explaining the positive, short- and long-term, 
investor reaction to the resignation.                    
Another aspect of the resignation—whether the resigning director soon joins another 
board—should also be examined, since if the resigning directors soon join other boards, then no 
time is released by the resignation. To examine this question, we track the number of board 
positions held by the resigning directors in the year subsequent to the resignation.  We focus on 
210 directors who have complete information available for the post-resignation period of 2005-
2008, and examine whether the number of their directorships has changed.  The baseline for this 
examination is the number of directorships immediately after the resignation (year t).  Of our 
sample, 69 directors were not included in this examination due to three reasons: (1) the retaining 
firm merged with another firm during the post-resignation period, (2) the director left the board 
                                                            
11 The exclusion of a retaining firm in Risk Metrics for a given year can be due to a variety of reasons, including (1) 
non-coverage of the firm in Risk Metrics, (2) merger and acquisition involving the firm, and (3) other changes 
involving the firm (e.g., delisting and bankruptcy).  Because Risk Metrics provides information on nominating 
committee chair and governance committee chair after 2007, we exclude directors’ role as the chair of these two 
committees from this examination.   
12 The limited and insignificant increase in the number of directors who chair audit committee is likely in part due to 
the requirement at many firms that only directors with financial expertise, who represent only a minority among all 
directors, can serve in this capacity. 
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and became a senior executive of the firm (e.g., the general counsel or chief information officer), 
or (3) no financial filing of the retaining firm was found in the post-resignation period.  The 
results of this test are reported in Table 10, Panel B, showing that the mean number of board 
positions kept by the director is 1.881 immediately after the resignation (year t), and 1.556 in the 
year following the resignation (year t+1).  Table 10, Panel B shows that this decrease in mean 
board membership is statistically significant at the 0.0001 level.  Specifically, we find that 54 
(155) directors further reduced (did not change) the number of their directorships after the 
resignation, whereas only 1 director acquired another directorship after the resignation.  Thus, 
our results demonstrate that the vast majority of resigning directors indeed became less 
distracted, further buttressing our findings of positive market reaction to resignation.  The 
decrease in the resigning directors’ “business” should be contrasted with the general increase in 
multi-directorships observed in Table 1.   
Taken together, the results in Table 10 indicate that in the post-resignation period 
directors significantly increase their board responsibilities and leadership at retaining firm boards 
and also remain focused on current board responsibilities by refraining from obtaining other 
board seats.  These effects support the view that less distracted directors are beneficial to 
corporate governance.                  
 
VIII. The Optimal Number of Board Seats  
Our findings indicate that reducing the number of multiple boards increases the 
effectiveness of directors.  Early research on the reputation capital of busy directors, however, 
argued that directors who serve on multiple boards are in high demand because of their 
experience and tested qualifications (e.g., Fama, 1980).  These conflicting views of the 
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desirability of busy directors raise the question of the optimal number of board seats that busy 
directors should have.  We provide insight to this question from investors’ perspective, by 
examining the extent to which the market reaction to busy directors’ resignation varies with the 
number of board seats kept by the director after the resignation.  We accordingly modify the 
regression of Table 7 to include indicatorvariables for the varying number of board seats after the 
resignation, ranging from two to eight or more seats.  This regression allows us to estimate the 
incremental price effect associated with the number of board seats after the resignation of busy 
directors.  We also control for the other eight determinants of investor reaction to resignation 
documented in Table 7, by including the first two principal components of these eight 
determinants (“Modified director value index #1 and #2”) in the regression.   
Table 11 reports the results of estimating the optimal number of board seats for busy 
directors.  We find that the coefficients on the number of board seats after resignation vary 
considerably, indicating a non-linear incremental effect.  Investors’ response coefficients are 
positive for up to four seats, and become negative for higher seat numbers.  The class of 
resigning director keeping three board seats has the largest and most significant coefficient 
(0.015, significant at the 0.023 level), whereas other seat numbers have statistically insignificant 
coefficients.  This pattern of coefficient estimates suggests that the benefits placed by investors 
on busy directors tend to peak at three to four directorships.     
 
IX. Conclusions 
This study investigates the desirability of multi-directorships by examining the impact of 
resignation of busy directors on the firms that still board these directors.  This study is timely 
because our data shows a generally increasing trend of multi-directorships. We find that the busy 
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directors resign from smaller, less profitable firms.  Our main finding is that investors in firms 
that keep busy directors after they resign from another firm react positively to the resignation.  
This is consistent with a positive contribution of the time and attention released after the director 
cuts back on his/her board commitments.  Our results further demonstrate that busy directors are 
valued by investors according to the demand for their services, the time availability of the 
director, and the director’s experience and intrinsic quality.  On average, investors seem to view 
three to four board seats as the optimal level of board commitment.  We also find that investors 
in the retaining firms do not fully comprehend the benefits of the less distracted directors after 
resignation.  Taken together, our results suggest that the increasing trend of busy directors is 
detrimental to effective corporate governance.  These findings should be of interest to boards 
nominating committees, to shareholders approving or challenging directors’ nominations, and 
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Descriptive Statistics for Directors: 1996-2010 
 
Panel A. Numbers of firms, director positions, and directors by year  
# directors per firm 
 # public company board 
positions per director 
Year # firms 
# director 







1996 1444 14867 11634 10.30 3.37 
 
NA NA 
1997 1584 15631 11977 9.87 3.24  NA NA 
1998 1770 17048 12936 9.63 3.15  1.46 0.93 
1999 1804 17420 13323 9.66 3.21  1.51 0.95 
2000 1756 16675 12946 9.50 3.14  1.48 0.91 
2001 1797 16669 13034 9.28 3.05  1.48 0.91 
2002 1439 13499 10681 9.38 2.84  1.49 0.91 
2003 1472 13792 10959 9.37 2.61  1.48 0.89 
2004 1477 13820 11047 9.36 2.57  1.51 0.89 
2005 1455 13582 11018 9.33 2.44  1.48 0.86 
2006 1413 13372 10879 9.46 2.39  1.49 0.84 
2007 1431 13338 10991 9.32 2.43  1.67 1.06 
2008 1460 13754 11393 9.42 2.44  1.66 1.01 
2009 1476 13815 11534 9.36 2.44  1.63 0.95 
2010 1481 13862 11555 9.36 2.42  1.61 0.92 
Total 23259 221144 175907 9.51 2.84  1.53 0.93 
Panel B. Number (percentage) of directors holding multiple directorships 
Year Only one Two Three Four Five 
 More than 
five All 
1996 NA NA NA NA NA 
 
NA NA 
1997 NA NA NA NA NA  NA NA 
1998 9465 (73.2) 1977 (15.3) 930 (7.2) 341 (2.6) 131 (1.0)  92 (0.7) 12936 
1999 9215 (69.5) 2378 (17.9) 1024 (7.7) 405 (3.1) 143 (1.1)  95 (0.7) 13260 
2000 9088 (70.2) 2359 (18.2) 914 (7.1) 389 (3.0) 130 (1.0)  66 (0.5) 12946 
2001 9145 (70.2) 2379 (18.3) 951 (7.3) 335 (2.6) 150 (1.2)  68 (0.5) 13028 
2002 7448 (69.7) 1969 (18.4) 818 (7.7) 287 (2.7) 101 (1.0)  58 (0.5) 10681 
2003 7610 (69.4) 2121 (19.4) 797 (7.3) 282 (2.6) 90 (0.8)  59 (0.5) 10959 
2004 7486 (67.8) 2223 (20.1) 852 (7.7) 341 (3.1) 96 (0.9)  49 (0.4) 11047 
2005 7616 (69.1) 2141 (19.4) 839 (7.6) 290 (2.6) 97 (0.9)  35 (0.3) 11018 
2006 7299 (67.1) 2350 (21.6) 849 (7.8) 272 (2.5) 78 (0.7)  31 (0.3) 10879 
2007 6570 (59.8) 2588 (23.6) 1169 (10.6) 412 (3.8) 170 (1.6)  76 (0.7) 10985 
2008 6765 (59.4) 2738 (24.0) 1240 (10.9) 424 (3.7) 163 (1.4)  61 (0.5) 11391 
2009 6896 (59.8) 2815 (24.4) 1234 (10.7) 393 (3.4) 151 (1.3)  44 (0.4) 11533 
2010 6962 (60.3) 2829 (24.5) 1215 (10.5) 394 (3.4) 122 (1.1)  33 (0.3) 11555 




Table 1 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics of Directors: 1996-2010 
 
Panel C. Age distribution of directors 
Year N Mean Median  
Standard 
deviation 25% 75% 
1996 11634 58.80 59 9.37 52 66 
1997 11977 58.61 59 9.38 52 65 
1998 12936 58.31 58 9.49 52 65 
1999 13323 58.27 58 9.48 52 65 
2000 12946 58.14 58 9.57 52 65 
2001 13034 58.07 58 9.63 52 65 
2002 10681 58.92 59 9.06 53 65 
2003 10959 59.19 59 8.89 53 65 
2004 11047 59.36 60 8.81 53 65 
2005 11018 59.78 60 8.67 54 66 
2006 10879 61.60 62 8.58 56 68 
2007 10991 61.12 61 8.70 55 67 
2008 11393 61.47 62 8.57 56 67 
2009 11534 61.76 62 8.58 56 68 
2010 11555 62.14 63 8.59 56 68 
Total 175907 59.64 60 9.17 53 66 
Panel D. Distribution of director tenure 
Year N Mean Median  
Standard 
deviation 25% 75% 
1996 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1997 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1998 12902 8.76 6 8.52 3 12 
1999 13292 8.63 6 8.52 3 12 
2000 12938 8.44 6 8.38 3 12 
2001 13034 9.81 6 52.99 3 12 
2002 10680 8.77 6 8.28 3 12 
2003 10953 8.70 6 8.22 3 12 
2004 11046 10.67 6 63.47 3 12 
2005 11014 8.76 6 8.24 3 12 
2006 10878 8.68 6 8.16 3 12 
2007 10963 8.59 6 8.06 3 12 
2008 11392 9.14 6 27.69 3 12 
2009 11532 8.88 6 8.03 3 12 
2010 11552 9.09 7 8.03 3 13 
Total 152176 8.99 6 25.36 3 12 
 
The statistics in this table are based on information on the population of all directors covered by Risk 




Characteristics of Resigning Busy Directors 
 
Panel A. Number of remaining boards after resignation 
Year N Mean Median  
Standard 
deviation 25% 75% 
2004 36 2.778 2.000 2.307 1.000 3.500 
2005 55 2.745 2.000 1.965 1.000 4.000 
2006 114 3.895 3.000 6.103 2.000 5.000 
2007 74 2.716 2.000 1.531 1.000 4.000 
Total 279 3.211 3.000 4.183 1.000 4.000 
 Panel B. Number of other outside public company boards after resignation  
Year N Mean Median  
Standard 
deviation 25% 75% 
2004 36 1.694 1.000 1.091 1.000 2.000 
2005 55 1.745 1.000 1.174 1.000 2.000 
2006 114 1.991 2.000 1.068 1.000 3.000 
2007 74 1.703 1.000 1.056 1.000 2.000 
Total 279 1.828 1.000 1.092 1.000 2.000 
 Panel C. Age of resigning busy directors  
Year N Mean Median  
Standard 
deviation 25% 75% 
2004 36 52.139 51.500 10.074 45.000 60.500 
2005 55 57.582 58.000 8.200 52.000 61.000 
2006 114 56.482 58.000 8.596 50.000 62.000 
2007 74 56.405 57.000 9.403 52.000 62.000 
Total 279 56.118 57.000 9.036 50.000 62.000 
 Panel D. Years of tenure of resigning busy directors  
Year N Mean Median  
Standard 
deviation 25% 75% 
2004 36 4.194 4.000 3.206 1.000 5.500 
2005 55 5.909 4.000 4.873 2.000 8.000 
2006 114 5.105 4.000 3.947 2.000 7.000 
2007 74 4.568 3.000 3.527 2.000 7.000 
Total 279 5.004 4.000 3.976 2.000 7.000 
 Panel E. Equity holding of resigning busy directors  
Year N < 1% 1%--5% 5%--10% 10%--20% > 20% 
2004 36 30 (83.3%) 2 (5.6%) 1 (2.8%) 1 (2.8%) 2 (5.6%) 
2005 55 46 (83.6%) 4 (7.3%) 3 (5.5%) 2 (3.6%) 0 (0.0%) 
2006 114 93 (81.6%) 10 (8.8%) 4 (3.5%) 4 (3.5%) 3 (2.6%) 
2007 74 61 (82.4%) 5 (6.8%) 4 (5.4%) 2 (2.7%) 2 (2.7%) 





The sample of 279 resigning directors was identified from 8-K filings that report the event of 
director resignation during 2004-2007.  We exclude 8-K reports that contain other unrelated 
items or are filed within 3 days of another 8-K report.  We focus on directors who served (still 
serve) on two or more (one or more) boards of public companies before (after) the resignation.  
Information on the director’s age, tenure, board responsibilities, and equity holding is from 
firms’ proxy statements. 




Declared Reasons for Resignation of Busy Directors 
 
Reasons cited for resignation  2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
 No reasons given  11 (30.56%) 16 (29.09%) 35 (30.70%) 19 (25.68%) 81 (29.03%) 
 No disagreement  7 (19.44%) 14 (25.45%) 30 (26.32%) 22 (29.73%) 73 (26.16%) 
 Other commitments  9 (25.00%) 6 (10.91%) 24 (21.05%) 10 (13.51%) 49 (17.56%) 
 Personsal reasons  4 (11.11%) 4 (7.27%) 8 (7.02%) 12 (16.22%) 28 (10.04%) 
 To meet independence standards  3 (8.33%) 5 (9.09%) 7 (6.14%) 6 (8.11%) 21 (7.53%) 
 New appointment as executives  1 (2.78%) 1 (1.82%) 2 (1.75%) 0 (0.00%) 4 (1.43%) 
 Age  0 (0.00%) 1 (1.82%) 1 (0.88%) 1 (1.35%) 3 (1.08%) 
 Health reasons  0 (0.00%) 2 (3.64%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (1.35%) 3 (1.08%) 
 Merger  0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.88%) 2 (2.70%) 3 (1.08%) 
 To comply with other governance guidelines  0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 2 (1.75%) 1 (1.35%) 3 (1.08%) 
 Other reasons  1 (2.78%) 6 (10.91%) 4 (3.51%) 0 (0.00%) 11 (3.94%) 
 Total  36 (100%) 55 (100%) 114 (100%) 74 (100%) 279 (100%) 
 






Industry Composition of Sample Firms 
 
Firms for which busy directors resign 
from the board (“resigned firms”) 
Firms for which busy directors remain 
on the board (“retaining firms”) 
Two-digit 













10 Metal mining 4 1.4% 0.2% 10 2.2% 0.6% 
13 Oil and gas extraction 7 2.5% 0.4% 10 2.2% 0.5%
20 Food and kindred products 3 1.1% 0.5% 10 2.2% 1.5%
23 Apparel and other finished products 4 1.4% 1.7% 2 0.4% 0.9%
27 Printing, publishing, and allied 4 1.4% 1.2% 2 0.4% 0.6%
28 Chemical and pharmaceutical products 35 12.5% 1.1% 53 11.9% 1.7%
35 Machinery and computer equipment 10 3.6% 0.7% 19 4.3% 1.3%
36 Electrical and electronics 26 9.3% 1.0% 30 6.7% 1.2%
37 Transportation equipment 7 2.5% 1.1% 8 1.8% 1.3%
38 Medical and scientific instruments 11 3.9% 0.6% 20 4.5% 1.1%
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 1 0.4% 0.4% 7 1.6% 2.9%
45 Air transportation 4 1.4% 1.6% 4 0.9% 1.6%
48 Communications 16 5.7% 1.2% 16 3.6% 1.2%
49 Utilities 5 1.8% 0.3% 16 3.6% 1.0%
50 Durable goods--wholesale 3 1.1% 0.5% 4 0.9% 0.7%
53 General merchandise stores 0 0.0% 0.0% 8 1.8% 6.4%
57 Home furniture and equipment store 3 1.1% 2.9% 2 0.4% 2.0%
58 Eating and drinking places 3 1.1% 0.8% 11 2.5% 2.8%
59 Miscellaneous retail 6 2.2% 1.2% 9 2.0% 1.8%
60 Depository institutions 10 3.6% 0.3% 14 3.1% 0.4%
61 Nondepository credit institutions 6 2.2% 1.3% 7 1.6% 1.5%
62 Security and commodity brokers 7 2.5% 1.2% 17 3.8% 3.0%
63 Insurance carriers 18 6.5% 2.1% 21 4.7% 2.4%
67 Holding, other investment offices 6 2.2% 0.4% 13 2.9% 0.9%
73 Computer software and data processing 32 11.5% 0.8% 43 9.7% 1.1%
79 Amusement and recreation 3 1.1% 0.9% 1 0.2% 0.3%
80 Health services 4 1.4% 0.8% 11 2.5% 2.3%
87 Professional services 9 3.2% 1.6% 11 2.5% 2.0%
Others 32 11.% 0.5% 66 14.8% 1.1%
Total   279 100.0% NA   445 100.0% NA 
 
“Percentage in sample” is the percentage ratio of the number of firms in an industry to the total number of firms in the sample.  “Percentage in 




Comparison of “Resigned” and “Retaining Firms” 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics of firms for which busy directors resign from the board (“resigned firms”) 
  N Mean Median  
Standard 
deviation 25% 75% 
 Total assets  279 10441.15(***) 837.231(***) 60417 205.24 3570.48 
 Return on assets (ROA)  279 -0.046 0.024(*) 0.230 -0.054 0.066 
 Sales growth rate  279 0.347 0.117 1.692 0.010 0.286 
 Market-to-book  279 3.994 2.135(**) 15.456 1.376 3.661 
 Leverage ratio  279 0.583 0.544(*) 0.367 0.374 0.747 
 Current ratio  279 3.226 1.917* 5.265 1.240 3.322 
 Capital expenditure  279 0.039(*) 0.021(***) 0.055 0.008 0.049 
 Cash flows from operation (CFO)  279 0.027 0.063(*) 0.200 0.004 0.115 
 Change in ROA  279 0.029** 0.007 0.260 -0.015 0.032 
 Change in CFO  279 0.037* 0.013 0.197 -0.015 0.049 
 Change in leverage ratio  279 0.017 -0.005 0.174 -0.041 0.047 
 Change in current ratio  279 -0.221 -0.028 4.335 -0.374 0.275 
 Panel B. Descriptive statistics of firms for which busy directors remain on the board (“retaining firms”) 
  N Mean Median  
Standard 
deviation 25% 75% 
 Total assets  445 45294.69 1548.93 210119 310.08 8680.05 
 Return on assets (ROA)  445 -0.024 0.034 0.267 -0.016 0.082 
 Sales growth rate  445 0.398 0.106 3.380 0.019 0.254 
 Market-to-book  445 3.296 2.408 21.613 1.471 4.434 
 Leverage ratio  445 0.624 0.582 0.367 0.415 0.791 
 Current ratio  445 3.217 1.727 6.120 1.111 2.783 
 Capital expenditure  445 0.047 0.030 0.061 0.011 0.060 
 Cash flows from operation (CFO)  445 0.041 0.077 0.232 0.012 0.139 
 Change in ROA  445 -0.014 0.007 0.173 -0.018 0.030 
 Change in CFO  445 0.009 0.007 0.159 -0.019 0.042 
 Change in leverage ratio  445 0.028 -0.001 0.184 -0.036 0.050 





Variable definitions are as follows.  Total assets are the amount of total assets in millions.  Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of the firm’s net 
income before extraordinary items to the amount of average total assets.  Sales growth rate is the percentage of the firm’s sales from the prior year 
to the current year.  Market-to-book is the ratio of the firm’s market value as of the fiscal year-end to the book value as of the fiscal year-end.  
Leverage ratio is the ratio of the firm’s long-term liabilities to total assets.  Current ratio is the ratio of the firm’s current assets to current 
liabilities.  Capital expenditure is the amount of capital expenditure deflated by the firm’s total assets.  Cash flows from operation (CFO) is the 
amount of cash flows from operation deflated by the firm’s average total assets.  Changes in ROA, CFO, leverage ratio, and current ratio are 
measured as the value of these ratios of the current year minus that of the prior year.   
 
(***), (**), (*) indicate that the value for firms in Panel A is significantly smaller than that for firms in Panel B at the 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 level, 
respectively.  ***, **, * indicate that the value for firms in Panel A is significantly greater than that for firms in Panel B at the 0.001, 0.01, and 




Univariate Analysis of Market Reaction to Busy Directors’ Resignation 
 
  N 3-day CAR p-value 
Panel A. All firms 
 Full sample  360 0.0040 0.051 
Panel B. Firms partitioned by the characteristics of retaining firms 
 B1. Industry type  
 Firms from high-tech industries  130 0.0138 0.003 
 Firms from non-high-tech industries  230   –0.0013 0.273 
 Difference  0.0151 0.004 
 B2. Firm size measured by market value  
 Small firms  180 0.0072 0.049 
 Large firms  180 0.0009 0.271 
 Difference  0.0063 0.088 
 B3. Industry overlap with the resigned firm  
 Firms from the same industry  88 0.0096 0.062 
 Firms from a different industry  272 0.0023 0.147 
 Difference  0.0073 0.086 
Panel C. Firms partitioned by the characteristics of firms from which busy directors resigned 
 C1. Most recent earnings change  
 Resigned from firm experiencing earnings decreases  140 0.0086 0.043 
 Resigned from firm not experiencing earnings decreases  220 0.0014 0.269 
 Difference  0.0072 0.083 
 C2. Extent of analyst following  
 Resigned from firm with significant analyst following  269 0.0059 0.029 
 Resigned from firm without significant analyst following  91   –0.0007 0.414 
 Difference  0.0067 0.068 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Univariate Analysis of Market Reaction to Busy Directors’ Resignation 
 
Panel D. Firms partitioned by the responsibilities of busy directors 
 D1. The number of boards served by the resigning director  
 Firms with the director serving on no more than 4 boards  254 0.0065 0.023 
 Firms with the director serving on more than 4 boards  106   –0.0017 0.274 
 Difference  0.0082 0.026 
 D2. The responsibility of the resigning director currently being a CEO  
 Firms with the director currently being a CEO  74 0.0101 0.008 
 Firms with the director not currently being a CEO  286 0.0027 0.157 
 Difference  0.0074 0.063 
 D3. Role of the resigning director on audit committee  
 Firms with the director serving on audit committee  127 0.0131 0.006 
 Firms with the director not serving on audit committee  233   –0.0006 0.396 
 Difference  0.0137 0.006 
 D4. Leadership role of the resigning director in corporate governance and control  
 Firms with the director playing a leadership role  19 0.0200 0.036 
 Firms without the director playing a leadership role  341 0.0034 0.087 
 Difference  0.0166 0.054 
Panel E. Firms partitioned by the expected contribution of busy directors 
 Firms in the highest-highest quartile of expected contribution  25 0.0407 0.034 
 Firms in the medium-high quartile of expected contribution  21 0.0024 0.389 
 Firms in the low-medium quartile of expected contribution  21   –0.0040 0.296 
 Firms in the lowest-lowest quartile of expected contribution  28 0.0009 0.401 




In all panels, the three-day (i.e., days –1, 0, and +1 centered on the announcement date of busy directors’ 
resignation) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are computed by using the standard approach of event 
study (e.g., Brown and Warner, 1985).  The abnormal returns (ARs) for each day are the difference 
between the firm’s raw returns and the returns on the size decile portfolio to which the firm is assigned.  
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each firm are the sum of the abnormal returns across the 
three days.  The p-value of the mean three-day cumulative abnormal returns across all sample firms is 
determined by following the procedure of Brown and Warner (1985).  Under this approach, the standard 
deviation of the mean cumulative abnormal returns is estimated by using 239 days of return data (days     
–233 through days –6 relative to the announcement day).  The test statistic controls for cross-sectional 
dependence in the abnormal returns because a portfolio average abnormal return is used to estimate the 
standard deviation.  In B1, sample firms are partitioned by whether the firm is from one of the six high-
tech industries, including chemical and pharmaceutical (2-digit SIC of 28), computer and machinery (2-
digit SIC of 35), electrical and electronics (2-digit SIC of 36), transportation equipment (2-digit SIC of 
37), medical and scientific instrument (2-digit SIC of 38), and computer software (2-digit SIC of 73).  In 
B2, sample firms are partitioned by whether the firm’s market value is below or above the median market 
value of all sample firms.  In B3, sample firms are partitioned by whether the retaining firm retaining the 
director is from the same industry as the resigned firm associated with the director.  In C1 and C2, sample 
firms are partitioned by whether the resigned firm experiences earnings decreases in the most recent year 
and whether the resigned firm has significant amount of analyst following (i.e., followed by more than 
two analysts), respectively.  In D1, sample firms are partitioned by the total number of boards served by 
the director after the resignation (no more than 4 vs. more than 4).  In D2, sample firms are partitioned by 
whether the director is currently a CEO.  In D3 and D4, sample firms are partitioned by whether the 
director served on the audit committee of the resigned firm and chaired the corporate governance 
committee and/or nominating committee of the resigned firm, respectively.  In Panel E, sample firms are 
partitioned jointly by the first two principal components based on the nine firm/director characteristics 
reflected in Panels B, C, and D (we use firm size measured by the firm’s market value in place to the 
indicator for firms with market value above/below the median value).  Specifically, all retaining firms are 
sorted into quartiles based on the first two principal components, respectively.  The four groups reported 
in Panel E are on the main diagonal at the intersection of these quartiles.  The highest-highest (lowest-
lowest) quartile consists of firms that are simultaneously classified into the highest (lowest) quartile of the 
first principal component and highest (lowest) quartile of the second principal component (i.e., the 
intersection of these two quartiles).  Low-medium is for the second lowest quartile, whereas medium-high 






Regression of Market Reaction to Busy Directors’ Resignation on Firm and  
Director Characteristics 
 









(p-value)   
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
 Intercept  0.030 0.007 0.003 0.026 0.008 
(0.082) (0.113) (0.490) (0.149) (0.034) 
Characteristics of retaining firms 
 Industry type  0.015 0.014 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 Firm size (log of market value)    –0.002   –0.002 
(0.042) (0.044) 
 Industry overlap  0.005 0.003 
(0.207) (0.325) 
Characteristics of resigned firms 
 Most recent earnings change  0.007 0.006 
(0.049) (0.099) 
 Extent of analyst following  0.009 0.008 
(0.048) (0.057) 
Responsibilities of busy directors 
 Number of boards served    –0.009   –0.009 
(0.051) (0.035) 
 Director being a CEO  0.007 0.007 
(0.052) (0.058) 
 Director's role in audit committee  0.011 0.010 
(0.009) (0.016) 
 Director's leadership role in governance and control  0.016 0.016 
(0.031) (0.054) 
Index for expected contributions of busy directors 
 Director value index #1  0.008 
(0.000) 
 Director value index #2  0.003 
(0.044) 
 Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
 Number of observations  360 360 360 360 360 
 p-value of F-statistics  0.001 0.055 0.003 0.0001 0.0001 





Variable definitions are as follows.  The dependent variable in all regressions is the three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) associated with the announcement of busy directors’ resignation.  The 
procedure for computing the three-day CARs is identical to that used in Table 6.  Industry type is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm is from one of the six high-tech industries, including chemical 
and pharmaceutical (2-digit SIC of 28), computer and machinery (2-digit SIC of 35), electrical and 
electronics (2-digit SIC of 36), transportation equipment (2-digit SIC of 37), medical and scientific 
instrument (2-digit SIC of 38), and computer software (2-digit SIC of 73) and zero otherwise.  Firm size 
is the firm’s market value.  Industry overlap is a dummy variable that equals one if the retaining firm 
retaining the director is from the same industry as the resigned firm associated with the director and zero 
otherwise.  Most recent earnings change is a dummy variable that equals one if the resigned firm 
experiences earnings decreases in the most recent year and zero otherwise.  Extent of analyst following is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the resigned firm has significant amount of analyst following (i.e., 
followed by more than two analysts) and zero otherwise.  Number of boards served is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the total number of boards served by the director after the resignation is more than four 
and zero otherwise.  Director being a CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the director is currently 
a CEO and zero otherwise.  Director’s role in audit committee is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
director served on the audit committee of the resigned firm and zero otherwise.  Director’s leadership role 
in governance and control is a dummy variable that equals one if the director chaired the corporate 
governance committee and/or nominating committee of the resigned firm and zero otherwise.  Director 
value index #1 and director value index #2 are the first two principal components of these nine 






Reaction of the Investors in the “Resigned Firms” 
 
  N 3-day CAR p-value 
 Mean  238 0.0086 0.002 
 Median 238 0.0022 0.018 
 
The three-day (i.e., days –1, 0, and +1 centered on the announcement date of busy directors’ resignation) 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are computed by using the standard approach of event study (e.g., 
Brown and Warner, 1985).  The abnormal returns (ARs) for each day are the difference between the 
firm’s raw returns and the returns on the size decile portfolio to which the firm is assigned.  The 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each firm are the sum of the abnormal returns across the three 
days.  The p-value of the mean three-day cumulative abnormal returns across all sample firms is 
determined by following the procedure of Brown and Warner (1985).  Under this approach, the standard 
deviation of the mean cumulative abnormal returns is estimated by using 239 days of return data (days     
–233 through days –6 relative to the announcement day).  The test statistic controls for cross-sectional 






Analysis of One-year-ahead Excess Stock Returns of “Retaining Firms” 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 Independent variable  
Mean 
coefficient      
(p-value)   
Mean 
coefficient      
(p-value) 
Panel A. Regression results for the retaining firms 
 Ln(MV)        –0.001       –0.001 
(0.134) (0.122) 
 Ln(B/M)  0.002 0.002 
(0.069) (0.071) 
 Ret_1        –0.021       –0.021 
(0.023) (0.023) 
 Ret_2  0.006 0.006 
(0.038) (0.038) 
 Ret_3        –0.001       –0.001 
(0.073) (0.074) 
 RESIGN  0.013 0.021 
(0.019) (0.048) 
 Director value index #1  —— 0.026 
(0.033) 
 Director value index #2  —— 0.023 
(0.028) 
Panel B. Regression results for the resigned firms 
 Ln(MV)        –0.001       –0.001 
(0.127) (0.127) 
 Ln(B/M)  0.002 0.002 
(0.076) (0.075) 
 Ret_1        –0.018       –0.019 
(0.039) (0.038) 
 Ret_2  0.006 0.006 
(0.038) (0.037) 
 Ret_3        –0.001       –0.001 
(0.076) (0.077) 










Variable definitions are as follows.  In Panels A and B, the dependent variable of the regression is 
firms’ monthly returns over the next 12-month period.  For the retaining firms (Panel A) and 
resigned firms (Panel B), this is the 12-month period subsequent to the busy director’s 
resignation.  The independent variables include the logarithm of the firm’s market value 
(Log(MV)), the logarithm of the firm’s book-to-market ratio (Log(B/M)) as of the end of the 
most recent fiscal-year, the return of the prior month (Ret_1), the return of the previous 12-month 
period (Ret_2), the return of the previous 36-month period (Ret_3), the dummy variable for busy 
directors’ resignation (RESIGN) that equals one for the retaining firm (Panel A) and the resigned 
firm (Panel B) and zero otherwise, and the director value index #1 and #2 (Panel A only), which 
are the first two principal components derived from the nine independent variables included in the 
regression of Table 7.  The regression in Panel A includes firms that keep the busy directors (i.e., 
the retaining firms) and all other firms.  The regression in Panel B includes firms from which the 
busy directors resign (i.e., the resigned firms).  In Panel A, the variables of RESIGN, director 
value index #1, and director value index #2 all take the value of zero for firms other than the 
retaining firms.  In Panel B, the variable of RESIGN takes the value of zero for firms other than 
the resigned firms.  The regression period is from March, 2004 through December, 2008 (the first 





Change in Busy Directors’ Responsibilities after Resigning from the Resigned Firm 
 
Panel A. Mean (median) number of committee positions on the retaining firms' board  







Difference       
(year t+1        
minus year t-1) 






 Chair of audit and/or compensation committees  134 0.239 0.314      0.075*** 0.006 0.011 
(0.000) (0.000)    (0.000)** 
 Audit committee chair or member  134 0.373 0.388 0.015 0.298 0.395 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Compensation committee chair or member  134 0.455 0.507   0.052* 0.073 0.074 
(0.000) (0.000)   (0.000)* 
 Governance committee chair or member  134 0.597 0.694   0.097* 0.062 0.084 
(0.000) (0.000)   (0.000)* 
 All committee positions  134 1.425 1.590    0.165** 0.019 0.021 
(1.000) (1.000)    (0.000)** 
Panel B. Mean (median) number of directorships immediately after resignation vs. a year after resignation 







Difference       
(year t+1        
minus year t) 






 Number of directorships per director  210 1.881 1.562      –0.319*** < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
(1.000) (1.000)         (0.000)*** 
 
  










 Intercept  –0.003 
(0.671) 
Number of board seats after resignation  
 Two board seats  0.005 
(0.268) 
 Three board seats  0.015 
(0.023) 
 Four board seats  0.009 
(0.130) 
 Five board seats  –0.004 
(0.388) 
 Six board seats  –0.003 
(0.392) 
 Seven board seats –0.002 
(0.428) 
 Eight or more board seats –0.001 
(0.456) 
Control for other eight director/firm characteristics and year effect 
 Modified director value index #1  0.007 
(0.004) 
 Modified director value index #2  0.005 
(0.010) 
 Year dummies Included 
 Number of observations  360 
 p-value of F-statistics  0.008 














Variable definitions are as follows.  The dependent variable of the regression is the three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) associated with the announcement of busy directors’ resignation.  The 
procedure for computing the three-day CARs is identical to that used in Table 6.  The number of board 
seats (two through eight or more board seats) is the number of directorships kept by the director after the 
resignation.  Modified director value index #1 (modified director value index #2) is the first (second) 
principal component of the independent variables in Table 6 other than the number of boards served.  p-
values for coefficients other than the intercept are one-tailed.    
 
 
